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May 8, 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 405th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, May 7, 1959

Present at the 405th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Donald A. Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 5); Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 5). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Item 1); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Item 1); the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Jernegan) (Item 5); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Curtis E. LeMay for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irvin II; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Foreign Economic Policy, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. PORT SECURITY: Proposed Revision of Paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 on Continental Defense and Paragraph 33-b of NSC 5808/1 on Poland (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5808/1; NSC 5819, Part 9; NSC Action No. 2051; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 8, 21 and 22, 1959)

Mr. Gordon Gray briefed the Council in detail concerning the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting, and another is attached to this Memorandum.)

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(d)

Agency Case: NSC 5819-752

NLE Date: 82-384-9

By: [Signature] NLE Date: 2/1/81

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2. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE FORTHCOMING
FOUR-POWER FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

Mr. Gray stated that it was his understanding that Secretary Herter would report his views about the forthcoming Four-Power Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva. Turning to the President, Secretary Herter said that knowing how crowded the President's calendar was for the day, he would make this report very brief.

Secretary Herter then explained that prior to the meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers in Washington at the end of April in connection with the NATO Tenth Anniversary, position papers for the Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting had been prepared by this Government. In these position papers we had proposed a package plan covering the four main elements: the German problem as a whole, European security, Berlin, and an All-German Peace Treaty. The labors of the Working Group composed of representatives of the U.S., U.K., France, and Germany had produced a reasonable agreement on this package plan up until the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington. At this latter meeting, however, Chancellor Adenauer had cancelled his previous approval of the package proposal. Accordingly, the Working Group had had to commence the exercise all over again. The Working Group met again in London and finally submitted new plans to the Foreign Ministers who met in Paris last week. At the Paris meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers, agreement had been reached on all but a few points with respect to the Western position to be taken at Geneva. The U.S. had emphasized at the Paris Foreign Ministers' Meeting its strong disinclination to discuss any fall-back position because we thought that the group was so large that it was dangerous because of a possible leak to the Soviets.

Moreover, at Paris we had made concessions from the point of view of our original package position. Two such concessions had been made to the Germans and one to the French. Incidentally, the British had agreed loyally to follow our line and had suggested no concessions. The first of the concessions made to Germany related to the problem of the reunification of that country. We had originally proposed a Mixed German Committee with representatives of the Laender from both East Germany and West Germany. The West Germans had not approved of this proposal because they feared that the Left Wing Socialists in the Federal Republic would combine with the Communist representatives from East Germany and thus outnumber the other representatives from West Germany. We had, accordingly, agreed on a new method of choosing the representatives of the Mixed Committee and we had also agreed that such a Mixed Committee would have no executive responsibility. It will be the duty of this Mixed Committee to draw up an All-German electoral law which would be followed by a plebescite.

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The concession we made to the French related to the problem of the level of forces in our plan for European security. At the behest of the French, we now describe our proposal about force levels as being illustrative in character. This satisfied the French and the actual level of forces would have to be fixed at a later time.

Secretary Herter added that the package plan itself was quite lengthy. He had, however, before him a five-page summary of the package plan. He said he would not read all of it because it would presently be distributed. Secretary Herter also cautioned against the danger of leaks and the possibility that domestic political issues might be injected into the package plan if it became known in some of the countries concerned.

Thereafter Secretary Herter summarized the main features of the package plan as follows. First as to Berlin, the plan stated that the Berlin problem must be considered in the framework of an over-all German settlement. East and West Berlin were to be combined through means of a popular election. The rights of the Occupation Forces in the unified Berlin would remain as they had been before.

Second, as to the reunification of Germany, our plan delineated the manner in which the All-German Committee would operate. The final popular vote on the reunification of Germany would be postponed for two or three years.

Third, as to the plan for European Security, Secretary Herter

Further with respect to the Peace Treaty, we had drafted a complete All-German Peace Treaty very different from that proposed by the Soviet Union. However, our allies had shown themselves not very eager to get into the minutiae of our proposed treaty. They did agree, however, to statements of the principles which should underlie such an All-German Peace Treaty and these principles had now been agreed upon. The Peace Treaty will be with a reunified

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Germany and there will be no separate peace treaties with East and West Germany. Thus we hope to avoid a freezing of the status quo in Eastern Europe as a whole which we believe is what the Soviets are most anxious to obtain.

Secretary Herter, turning to the prospects for the success of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Geneva, said it was very hard to tell what would eventually happen. There were decidedly conflicting reports about the Soviet attitude toward the meeting. Some reports had it that the Soviets would be very harsh and un-conciliatory. Other reports indicated that the Russians would be prepared to make concessions at the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers in order to ensure a subsequent meeting at the Summit. Perhaps, thought Secretary Herter, the balance was slightly in favor of the latter view.

Among ourselves and our allies there was firm agreement to hold to the line which had been decided upon. None of our allies will make any change in our package plan without prior agreement of all of the other allies.

Secretary Herter cautioned against the likelihood of rapid progress at Geneva, stating that it might take a whole week of wrangling to determine procedural matters such as, for example, which countries were actually entitled to representation at the conference table.

Secretary Herter indicated that of course he was prepared to go into much greater detail in this report if the Council so desired but he pointed out that all these details would soon be available to members of the Council in writing. He again warned that he had undertaken an obligation to maintain secrecy about the details of the plan and therefore felt that he should say no more at the present time.

Mr. Gray inquired of Secretary Herter whether he really felt it was necessary to circulate the plan in writing to the members of the Council. Would it not be better for the heads of the departments and agencies to come to Secretary Herter and ask him any questions which bothered them? Secretary Herter said he would certainly be much happier if the Council would accept Mr. Gray's suggestion and added that the Department of Defense already had a copy of the detailed plan. Mr. Gray commented that his proposal stemmed from his desire that no leak about our package plan should come from a meeting of the National Security Council.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Secretary of State.

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The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2012-b, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 10, 1959.
- b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board is taking the OCB report into account in its current review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1)

S. Everett Gleason
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